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Higher-order cognitive factors affect subjective but not proprioceptive aspects of self-representation 20 
in the rubber hand illusion 21 
1. Introduction 22 
Processes of multisensory integration underlie the most fundamental aspects of self-23 
representation (Blanke, 2012; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Jeannerod, 2006). Indeed, it has been 24 
proposed that human bodily self-consciousness at its most basic, pre-reflexive level results from the 25 
constant presence and integration of information from our multiple sensory systems (Gallagher, 26 
2005; Tsakiris, 2010). Bodily self-representation, however, is not as stable as it appears to the 27 
individual. Experimental perceptual illusions that disrupt body representation by manipulating 28 
multisensory inputs provide compelling evidence that, despite its perceived constancy, our 29 
representation of self can be easily and profoundly modified (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; 30 
Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, 2007; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Lenggenhager, Tadi, 31 
Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). These findings highlight one of the most important topics in psychology 32 
and neuroscience today, the extent of human neural plasticity in immediate response to experience. 33 
1.1. Experimental manipulation of self-representation: The rubber hand illusion 34 
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a widely employed paradigm that demonstrates how perception 35 
of the body can be manipulated through the presentation of incongruous visual and tactile inputs 36 
administered to the hands (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Typically, in this illusion a participant’s hand is 37 
concealed from view and replaced with a rubber prosthesis. The prosthesis is placed in the 38 
approximate position and angle of the participant’s concealed limb, while introducing a slight spatial 39 
deviation between the two (with the rubber hand closer in towards the body midline than the real 40 
hand). The participant’s own hand and the rubber hand then receive identical tactile stimulation 41 
(RHI induction), usually in the form of stroking with a paintbrush – precisely synchronising the timing 42 
and location of strokes. This creates a match between what is seen on the rubber hand and what is 43 
felt on the participant’s hidden hand. 44 
During the RHI, there are a number of effects on self-representation. These effects can be 45 
divided into the general categories of subjective (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Costantini & Haggard, 46 
2007; Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007), 47 
proprioceptive (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Holle, McLatchie, Maurer, & Ward, 2011; Rohde, Di Luca, 48 
& Ernst, 2011) and physiological outcomes (Barnsley et al., 2011; Moseley et al., 2008). 49 
The subjective effects of the illusion refer to general alterations in the psychological, bodily 50 
experience of an individual i.e. changes in how their body and their body parts feel. These subjective 51 
outcomes are thought to reflect the experience of incorporating the rubber hand into the 52 
participant’s own body representation as well as rejection of their actual hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 53 
1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris, 2010). These outcomes are generally assessed using a 54 
questionnaire or verbal report.  55 
The RHI also produces changes in the perceived location of the participant’s hand, shifting it 56 
from its actual location towards the location of the rubber hand. There are a number of methods for 57 
assessing this proprioceptive change. Typically, participants are asked to estimate the position of 58 
their hidden hand before and after RHI induction and the systematic error caused by the illusion is 59 
measured. This can be achieved through verbal report of the perceived location or pointing with the 60 
unstimulated hand (i.e. behavioural measures). This change is often referred to as proprioceptive 61 
drift. 62 
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Various physiological changes have been identified following RHI, including alterations in 63 
temperature (Moseley et al., 2008), immune function (Barnsley et al., 2011) and galvanic skin 64 
response (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003) in the stimulated hand compared to the control hand. 65 
These changes are thought to reflect the disruption of subjective ownership of that limb (Barnsley et 66 
al., 2011; Moseley et al., 2008). 67 
 68 
1.2. New evidence suggests original models of RHI mechanisms are incorrect 69 
In the popular model put forward by Tsakiris (2010), induction of the RHI produces changes in 70 
subjective self-representation which, in turn, produce the alterations in proprioception. In this 71 
conceptualisation, subjective outcomes cause proprioceptive outcomes and therefore are 72 
considered a behavioural proxy. 73 
Contrary to this model, new behavioural evidence suggests that subjective and proprioceptive 74 
RHI outcomes are in fact dissociable. For example, a number of studies have demonstrated 75 
proprioceptive drift towards a rubber hand without associated increases in felt ownership over the 76 
rubber hand, when the participant’s hand is kept still (Holle et al., 2011; Rohde et al., 2011) and 77 
when making point-to-target actions (Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006).  78 
Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris and Haggard (2008a) conducted a large-scale qualitative 79 
analysis of first-person RHI experience. They found Location (representing proprioceptive change) 80 
and Ownership scales to be significant independent predictors of proprioceptive change levels, 81 
indicating that perceived limb shifts should be considered separately from subjective ownership of 82 
the rubber hand.  83 
Subjective and proprioceptive aspects of self-representation are also shown to be distinct in 84 
their relationship with other aspects of perception (Longo et al., 2008a). Longo et al. (2008a) 85 
investigated the relationship of RHI outcomes to participant’s ratings of similarity in appearance 86 
between their hand and the rubber hand. Individuals who reported high levels of subjective illusion 87 
intensity on a questionnaire reported significantly greater similarity in appearance than those who 88 
experienced low subjective levels of illusion. Notably, when comparing objective measures of 89 
similarity (made by a double-blind observer), there were no actual appearance differences between 90 
the high and low subjective illusion groups. Given the objective similarity in appearance, and that 91 
the similarity judgements were collected following illusion induction, the authors concluded the 92 
effectiveness of the ownership manipulation caused the rubber hand to be perceived as more 93 
similar to the participant’s own hand – rather than the other way around. There was no such 94 
relationship with proprioceptive indicators of the illusion indicating shifting limb-location did not 95 
change visual perception of the rubber hand in the same way. 96 
Neurophysiological evidence also indicates the existence of separate components of body 97 
representation that are subserved by distinct neural systems. Kammers et al. (2008) administered 98 
rTMS over the inferior posterior parietal lobe (IPL) during  RHI induction. They found significant 99 
reductions in immediate proprioceptive judgements of limb position while subjective ownership 100 
over the rubber hand and ballistic action responses were unaffected. 101 
 102 
1.3. Multimodal models of self-representation 103 
It now appears self-representation is not supported by one homogenous neurocognitive 104 
system, and that distinct systems support proprioceptive position estimation and higher-order 105 
subjective body-representations (Kammers, de Vignemont, Verhagen, & Dijkerman, 2009; Kammers 106 
et al., 2008; Rohde et al., 2011). While the tight integration of all self-representation systems is 107 
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critical to the production of a coherent, global ‘sense of self’, it appears these subsystems may be 108 
driven by very different processes of multisensory integration at disparate neural locations. 109 
Subjective self-representation is thought to be governed by processes of intermodal matching 110 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris, Costantini, & Haggard, 111 
2008). In this process, sensory inputs that arise on the body in precise temporal and spatial 112 
synchrony are determined to be caused by the same event and are, therefore, integrated. This 113 
allows related multisensory body inputs to be perceived as a single, coherent percept – rather than a 114 
jumble of concurrent signals. Intermodal matching leads the object of stimulation to be identified as 115 
self which produces the psychological experience of subjective self-representation (Botvinick & 116 
Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris et al., 2008). Therefore, in the RHI, 117 
synchronicity between visual inputs seen on the rubber hand and tactile inputs felt on the 118 
participant’s own hand cause incorporation of the rubber hand into the body image and the 119 
rejection of the own hand. 120 
Activity in ventral premotor (PMv) and cerebellar areas has been associated with subjective 121 
self-representation in fMRI studies of the RHI. Ehrsson and colleages (2004;2005) found levels of 122 
BOLD activity correlated directly with reported levels of subjective illusion, and, activity-onset 123 
matched self-reported illusion onset (Ehrsson et al., 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004). Such findings are 124 
aligned with previous research regarding the functions of the PMv and cerebellum. The PMv is 125 
known to receive inputs from visual and somatosensory areas in the posterior regions of the parietal 126 
cortex (Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998) allowing detection of concurrent inputs from the body. 127 
The cerebellum has been linked functionally with parietal and premotor cortices (Dum & Strick, 128 
2003) and is thought to be involved in the analysis of timing of sensory inputs (Blakemore, Frith, & 129 
Wolpert, 2001) making it a likely candidate for integration of inputs in the self-other discrimination 130 
process. This research suggests the critical role of the PMv and cerebellum in analysing the 131 
synchronicity of multisensory bodily inputs in determining self from non-self objects. 132 
 133 
In contrast, the system proposed to underlie perception of body position (and thus, 134 
proprioceptive RHI outcomes) is far more simple than that supporting subjective self-representation. 135 
Under normal conditions, afferent kinasthetic and somatosensory information is the most important 136 
sensory source of information in the estimation of limb position (Guerraz et al., 2012; Teasdale et al., 137 
1993). The RHI creates a mismatch between proprioceptive and visual limb position information 138 
causing the brain to assess the reliability of information from these two systems (van Beers, Sittig, & 139 
Dernier van der Gon, 1999). Visual information over-rides proprioceptive due to the inherent high 140 
acuity of the visual system and the [typically] high quality of the visual information available in the 141 
RHI context (e.g. high luminance, direct viewing orientation) (Rohde et al., 2011). Thus, the 142 
reweighting of sensory inputs causes the felt position of the hand to be altered to match the visual 143 
position of the hand, i.e. proprioceptive change. 144 
It was once thought that under all situations of uncertainty, proprioceptive position would be 145 
‘captured’ to match visual position (Hay, Pick, & Ikeda, 1965; Rock & Victor, 1964; Singer & Day, 146 
1969). In fact, it now appears that the central nervous system selects the sense with the optimal 147 
reliability to make the required judgement on a case-by-case basis. This flexibility allows for the 148 
construction of the most accurate perception of body position based on available sensory 149 
information (Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004; Fitzpatrick & McCloskey, 1994; Guerraz et al., 2012; van Beers 150 
et al., 1999).  151 
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As mentioned previously, rTMS of the IPL produces a marked reduction in proprioceptive RHI 152 
outcomes suggesting this area is critical to on-line modulation of body perception. Damage to the 153 
left IPL has been linked with clinical deficits in the ability to locate and position body parts 154 
(autotopagnosia; Ogawa & Inui, 2007; Ogden, 1985) further supporting its role in analysis of the 155 
current body state and spatial relationships between limbs. Activation in the right insular cortex and 156 
frontal operculum has been found to correlate positively with proprioceptive change levels (Tsakiris 157 
et al., 2007). This activation appears to represent the alteration in proprioceptive position sense to 158 
match the visual rubber hand position (Kammers et al., 2008) again supporting the role of the insular 159 
and operculum in proprioceptive self-representation. 160 
 161 
1.4. Effect of top-down factors in the RHI: Revision to previous theories 162 
A number of studies report extinction of RHI effects when visual information about the rubber 163 
hand conflicts with internal information about the actual limb state or posture; for example, when 164 
the rubber hand is rotated to an anatomically impossible position with-respect-to the real hand 165 
position (180°, Ehrsson et al., 2004; 90°, Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Even minor postural adjustments 166 
of the rubber hand (10 or 30°, Costantini & Haggard, 2007) have been reported to attenuate RHI 167 
effects. In the light of these results, Botvinick and Cohen’s original (1998) theory was expanded to 168 
include the modulation of bottom-up sensory effects by top-down cognitive functions (Tsakiris, 169 
Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010). In this model, a ‘goodness-of-fit’ comparison occurs 170 
between incoming sensory information and internal body models. If there is a sufficient fit between 171 
them, intermodal matching processes will occur. A mismatch leads to rejection of the sensory 172 
information. 173 
We believe a revision of this ‘goodness-of-fit’ model may be required to reflect these separable 174 
aspects of self-representation. Indeed, it appears higher-order cognitive factors may not, in fact, 175 
modulate both components of self-representation as was once thought. Holle et al. (2011) found 176 
that while subjective illusion was eliminated for hands rotated by 180°, proprioceptive change was 177 
still present, though reduced. They suggested previous studies (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Tsakiris 178 
& Haggard, 2005) that failed to demonstrate drift to rotated hands simply lacked power to identify 179 
this small effect. Similarly, when taking frequent measurements of proprioceptive change (every 10 180 
or 40 seconds) Rohde et al. (2011) produced significant drift in synchronous, asynchronous and 181 
vision-only control (no tactile stimulation) conditions. Therefore, even when sensory inputs did not 182 
match, drift still occurred. In the light of this information, we suggest that while proprioceptive self-183 
representation is resistant to both mismatches in posture and incongruent multisensory inputs (i.e. 184 
violations of top-down body information), subjective self-representation is not. Inconsistent 185 
information about the body appears to disrupt these higher-order psychological aspects of self-186 
recognition, although at this stage this cannot be concluded with much certainty. The current study 187 
aims to explore the differential effect of top-down cognitive factors on subjective and proprioceptive 188 
aspects of self-representation under a novel situation of illusory location manipulation where self-189 
location is drawn away from the actual body position. 190 
 191 
1.5. Is it possible to draw felt position away from the locus of the body, towards extracorporeal 192 
space? 193 
Traditionally, RHI experiments have been conducted with the participant’s real hand displaced 194 
laterally away from the body midline, with the rubber hand located medially, towards the body – 195 
often in line with the approximate shoulder position (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Asai & Tanno, 196 
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2007; Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Heed et al., 2011). From these experiments it is clear that 197 
proprioceptive alterations (drift) can be produced towards the body. Additionally, it is clear that 198 
subjective embodied position can also be drawn in, towards the body. We wish to determine 199 
whether both aspects of self-representation can be shifted away from the body location, towards 200 
extracorporeal space. Further to this, we wish to investigate the relationship between subjective and 201 
proprioceptive RHI outcomes – is the relationship between these outcomes altered when the RHI 202 
occurs away from the body. 203 
 204 
Explicitly shifting the locus of the self away from the body is contrary to natural proprioceptive drift 205 
and top-down expectation 206 
In the absence of visual body information, felt location of the limb has been demonstrated 207 
to shift towards the body in a radial direction when at rest (Wann & Ibrahim, 1992) and when 208 
making reach-to-grasp movements (Holmes et al., 2006) [though see (Desmurget, Vindras, Grea, 209 
Viviani, & Grafton, 2000)]. In this way, shifting the locus of self away from the body position, into 210 
extracorporeal space can be seen as a violation of top-down cognitive expectation because it 211 
contradicts the natural orientation of perceptual shifts i.e. towards the body, which is a default of 212 
the biomechanics of the limb. 213 
Further to this, cases where self-localisation is shifted away from the body (as in autoscopic 214 
hallucinations, out-of-body experiences and heautoscopy) are reported to produce unnatural and 215 
bizarre subjective experiences, feelings of derealisation and generally represents a striking 216 
disturbance of conscious bodily experience (Blanke & Arzy, 2005; Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 217 
2004). These experiences are thought to be at least partly caused by a break-down of normal 218 
multisensory integration processes (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). These experiences have also been 219 
found to be associated with pathological sensations of movement and position (Blanke et al., 2004) 220 
and body distortion processing (Braithwaite, Samson, Apperly, Broglia, & Hulleman, 2011). 221 
In a non-clinical population, it is possible to induce a similar shift in the location of self – out 222 
from the body, outside the physical bodily borders – using full-body illusions (Lenggenhager et al., 223 
2007).  Subjects report their experience in such experiments as being highly ‘strange’ and ‘weird’ 224 
and many found the experiment to be cause subjective ‘irritation’ (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). These 225 
whole body illusion experiments reveal that global localisation and identification of the ‘self’ rely on 226 
similar multisensory mechanisms as with individual body parts, as in the RHI (Lenggenhager et al., 227 
2007). 228 
In contrast, when the illusory shift in self-identification and ownership occurs at the site of 229 
the own-body – as in the body-swap illusion, where the subject sees (via a head mounted display) a 230 
virtual avatar in place of their body and change is induced via visuo-tactile manipulations – these 231 
subjective alterations occur quickly and easily, and subjects report feeling natural about the shift of 232 
the position of their ‘self’ into this new body. This occurs even when subjects shake hands with their 233 
own real-body via the video illusion (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008).  234 
Thus it appears that as a natural default of the proprioceptive system, felt position will shift 235 
in towards central body space. To draw this location out and away from the body into extracorporeal 236 
space, therefore, would require an explicit cognitive shift – as achieved in our experiment, and in the 237 
Lenggenhager et al. (2007) experiments. Such a change, however, is by design contrary to natural 238 
bodily experience and higher-level knowledge about the body position. 239 
 240 
Aims and hypotheses 241 
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If, as we propose, bodily perception results from a simple bottom-up process that is resistant to 242 
the effects of top-down factors it should be possible to produce proprioceptive drift in and out from 243 
the body, despite the mismatch created between the illusory, seen position of the hand and actual 244 
body position. Conversely, mismatches between external (sensory) and internal information about 245 
the body state or position may extinguish subjective ownership and embodiment. If this is indeed 246 
the case, using the RHI to draw the locus of the subjective self away from the actual body position 247 
would diminish subjective incorporation of the rubber hand into the self. To investigate the 248 
conditions that produce proprioceptive drift and whether they are indeed distinct from those 249 
required for higher-order subjective bodily experiences, our study induced illusory location shifts 250 
towards (In condition) and away from the body position (Out condition). The relationship between 251 
self-rated illusion experience and proprioceptive judgements was investigated separately within the 252 
In and Out conditions. The use of a detailed, multi-scaled questionnaire (Longo et al., 2008a) allowed 253 
a more comprehensive picture of subjective RHI experience than that provided by traditional 254 
measures (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998).  255 
Previous findings suggest subjective embodiment (but not proprioceptive change) alters visual 256 
perception of the rubber hand (Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2009). In the light of 257 
such results, two measures of second-order perception were included in the current study. These 258 
were self-rated similarity in appearance between the real and rubber hand (as in Longo et al., 2009), 259 
and a novel measure, the similarity in [felt] brushing seen on the rubber hand and felt on the 260 
participant’s own hand. It was predicted that the reduction in subjective incorporation of the rubber 261 
hand in the Out condition would lead to lower visual and tactile similarity ratings – compared to the 262 
In condition. Such a result would further support the modulation of subjective RHI outcomes 263 
between conditions as well as demonstrate, for the first time, the manipulation of tactile perception 264 
by the RHI induction. 265 
 266 
2. Methods 267 
2.1. Participants 268 
The sample consisted of 50 undergraduate students from The University of Queensland who 269 
completed the experiment for course credit. To avoid potential carry-over effects of the two 270 
directions of RHI manipulation, a between-groups design was used. There were 22 in the In 271 
Condition (11 male, 11 female) and 28 in the Out condition (9 male, 19 female). Mean ages were 20 272 
(Range: 17-27, SD = 2.4) and 21.50 (Range: 17-31; SD = 4.5) for the In and Out conditions 273 
respectively. Participants were predominantly of Caucasian skin-tone (54%), with 34% Asian and the 274 
remainder (12%) of a darker skin-tone classification [Independent groups t-tests demonstrated there 275 
were no significant differences in skin tone between the In and Out groups, t(48) = -.305, p = .761]. 276 
Out of 50 participants, 45 were right-handed (EHI = 65.99, SE =3.39) using the EHI classification 277 
of handedness (Oldfield, 1971). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. There were no 278 
significant differences in the distribution of gender, age, skin-tone, handedness (EHI), medical issues 279 
(vision, hearing) between the In & Out conditions. 280 
 281 
2.2. Apparatus 282 
The experiment was conducted on a specially constructed apparatus consisting of three 283 
equidistant shelves [see Figure1a below]. A LCD computer screen was fitted into the top shelf, facing 284 
downwards, for presentation of experimental stimuli onto a mirror below. Participants sat at the 285 
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apparatus with their hands placed on the lowermost shelf. A black cloth placed over the participant’s 286 
shoulders prevented visual information about the position of their arms. Looking into the mirror 287 
participants saw the hand images reflected at the same approximate position, depth plane and size 288 
as their own hands, creating a convincing illusion. 289 
 290 
#Figure1a and 1b approximately here # 291 
 292 
2.3. Hand images: Appearance and positioning of participants’ hands with respect to hand image 293 
The hand image stimuli consisted of a left and right hand of Caucasian skin tone, medium size 294 
and indeterminate gender (i.e. nails were short, fingers were of intermediate width). In the In 295 
Condition, the participant’s hands were positioned 7cm in from either edge of the computer screen 296 
and the hand images were 15cm in. Positions were inverted in the Out condition (participant’s hands 297 
at 15cm, and hand image at 7cm from the screen edge). Distance between the real hand and the 298 
hand images (8cm) [Figure1b] was kept constant so proprioceptive drift could be compared for 299 
relative position alone (as previous research has shown separation distance effects drift magnitude, 300 
Lloyd, 2007). 301 
 302 
2.4. Measurement of change in bodily perception: Proprioceptive drift magnitude 303 
Measurements of static proprioceptive hand position were made using a digital image of a ruler 304 
displayed on-screen. Rather than presenting the same ruler repeatedly, one of a set of 15 rulers 305 
(starting point varied, e.g. ruler 1 spanning 1cm to 30cm, ruler 2 5cm to 35cm) was randomly 306 
selected to appear on screen at each trial. The use of multiple rulers prevented participants learning 307 
or remembering the position of their finger on the ruler. 308 
The ruler was presented on-screen so their position and depth plane matched that of the tip of 309 
the participants’ finger middle finger [see Figure1b]. Subjects were asked to estimate the location of 310 
their hidden left middle finger by reporting the number on the ruler closest to its position. This was 311 
reported verbally and recorded by the experimenter to ensure participant’s hands could remain still, 312 
in position for the entire trial duration. 313 
Position judgements were taken before and after RHI induction at each of the nine trials. Pre-314 
RHI error was subtracted from post-RHI error to give an absolute value of movement towards the 315 
hand image following induction. This score was labelled drift magnitude and represented the 316 
alteration in proprioceptive self-representation caused by the RHI. Positive scores represented 317 
movement of perceived position from the actual hand position towards the hand image, negative 318 
scores represented movement away. 319 
 320 
2.5. Assessment of subjective self-representation: The RHI Questionnaire or RHIQ 321 
Longo and colleagues (2008a) used a comprehensive qualitative analysis and principle 322 
components analysis to separate subjective RHI experience into five distinct subcomponents. These 323 
were Embodiment [subscales: Ownership, Location, Agency], collectively representing feelings that 324 
the object (rubber hand or own hand) is part of the self, and is owned and controlled by the 325 
individual.  Loss of Own Hand gauges feelings that the participant’s own hand had ‘disappeared’ 326 
during the illusion. Movement assesses sensations that the participant’s hand had shifted in space 327 
from its original location. Affect assesses whether participants felt the experience was positive or 328 
negative. Finally, the Sensation scale asks about the presence or absence of perceptual sensations 329 
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resulting from the illusion such as pins and needles or numbness [see Footnotea for an example item 330 
for each scale or Supplementary Materials, item A for the full 25 item questionnaire].  331 
This 25 item scale was employed (over the traditional seven-item Botvinick & Cohen (1998) 332 
scale) in order to comprehensively assess the complexity in first-person RHI experience. Question 333 
one, two and seven of the Longo et al.(2008a)  scale form the Ownership scale from the original 334 
Botvinick and Cohen (1998) questionnaire allowing direct comparability of our subjective results 335 
with previous studies that employ this scale. Interestingly, these three items typically are the only 336 
questions of the seven Botvinick and Cohen (1998) items to receive significant positive endorsement 337 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Rohde et al., 2011) suggesting the full-scale may be of limited usefulness. 338 
 339 
Footnotea. Sample questions for each of the five separate components of subjective self-340 
representation as described by Longo et al. (2008a) 341 
Embodiment: “It seemed like the hand image was part of my body” (Q3) 342 
Loss of Own Hand: “It seemed like my hand disappeared” (Q16) 343 
Movement: “It seemed like my hand was moving towards the hand image” (Q18) 344 
Affect: “I found the experience enjoyable” (Q20) 345 
Sensation: “I had the sensation of pins and needles in my hand” (Q22) 346 
 347 
Participants respond on a seven-point Likert Scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly 348 
agree. This was later recoded to range from -3 to +3 in line with traditional RHI scoring practices. 349 
The questionnaire was employed on two separate trials directly following RHI induction. 350 
Position of these trials was randomised throughout the nine trials. A measurement of proprioceptive 351 
drift was taken following the questionnaires but not included in the general drift analysis. 352 
 353 
2.6. RHI Induction procedure 354 
Participant’s hands were positioned by the experimenter at the beginning of each trial. The 355 
ruler was presented on the screen 2500ms after hand placement, at which time participants made 356 
their pre-RHI estimation of hand position. Both the real hand and the hand image were brushed in 357 
synchrony at approximately 1Hz for a period of 90 seconds using a set of soft brushes 358 
[approximately .5cm diameter] affixed to the apparatus to ensure pressure and contact of the brush 359 
remained constant over participants. At the finish of the RHI induction there was a 2500ms pause 360 
before the ruler was presented on the screen and participants made their post-RHI judgement. 361 
Between trials, participants were instructed to move their hand onto their lap. Inter-trial interval 362 
(ITI) was 90 seconds [to match RHI induction duration]. 363 
 364 
Some RHI experiments include a condition of asynchronous stimulation where tactile 365 
stimulation is applied to both the real and rubber hand surfaces, but does not match. This is done to 366 
assess the effects of intermodal matching on RHI effects. The presence of drift in synchronous and 367 
absence in asynchronous conditions has been widely demonstrated by previous research (Botvinick 368 
& Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris et al., 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 369 
2005). Indeed, some recent studies suggest that visuo-tactile stimulation is unnecessary for the 370 
production of proprioceptive drift, but rather, illusory hand information alone is required (Rohde et 371 
al., 2011).  372 
The purpose of the current study was not to investigate what arrests the experience of RHI, but 373 
how it manifests under certain conditions (In and Out from the body), meaning the comparison of 374 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions was not of direct relevance to the study’s aims. For this 375 
10 
 
reason an asynchronous condition was not included in this study *as in Botvinick & Cohen’s original 376 
1998 study that also employed synchronous stroking only], rather we compared the effect of our 377 
direction manipulation on synchronous conditions alone. 378 
 379 
2.7. Experimenter and participant ratings of similarity in appearance and brushing 380 
2.7.1. Participant ratings 381 
At the completion of the experiment, participants were asked a series of questions regarding 382 
how similar they believed the rubber hand was in appearance to their own hand (similarity in 383 
appearance measure) and, secondly, how similar the brushing on their hand was to the brushing 384 
they saw on the hand on the screen (similarity in brushing measure). These ratings were made on a 385 
Likert scale from one to ten, with one representing ‘very dissimilar’ and ten ‘very similar’. 386 
 387 
2.7.2. Experimenter ratings 388 
Prior to experiment onset, the experimenter recorded the skin-tone of the participant on a 389 
trichotomous scale (1: fair – e.g. Caucasian, 2: mid-tone – e.g. Chinese, Japanese, 3: dark-tone – e.g. 390 
Pakistani, African). Gender was also recorded. This was done to give a blunt, objective measure of 391 
approximate hand appearance in terms of skin colour, size, hair-coverage etc. 392 
On completion of the RHI induction at each of the nine trials, the experimenter made a rating of 393 
the visuo-tactile brushing ‘effectiveness’. This rating was from 0 to 100%, with 0% representing no 394 
match and 100% representing a complete match between the brushing on the participant’s own 395 
hand and the hand image (in terms of brushing angle, pressure and timing). 396 
 397 
3. Results 398 
3.1. Proprioceptive drift magnitude (drift) 399 
Overall, a high number of participants demonstrated significant levels of proprioceptive change 400 
(74% had a drift magnitude significantly greater than zero using one-sample t-tests with Bonferroni 401 
corrections for multiple comparisons).  402 
Post-RHI error was subtracted from pre-RHI error to create the drift magnitude score (see 403 
TableA for pre and post raw scores). This score was used for our experimental comparisons as it 404 
represents the absolute value of change caused by the illusion. In both conditions, One-Sample t-405 
tests showed drift magnitude was significantly greater than zero – indicating a change in felt location 406 
from actual position towards the hand image when the illusory shift was towards the body (In 407 
condition, M = 1.31, SE = 0.30; t(21) = 4.38, p < .001) and away from the body (Out condition, M = 408 
2.60, SE = 0.24 ; t(27) = 11.05, p < .001)b. Thus proprioceptive drift was successfully created in both 409 
the In and Out conditions. 410 
 411 
Footnoteb: An alpha level of .05 was used as the significance criterion for all statistical tests. 412 
Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons were applied when required.  413 
 414 
# Table A  approximately here # 415 
 416 
3.2. Subjective self-representation: RHI Questionnaire (RHIQ) 417 
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Total RHIQ Scores were quite low overall, i.e. close to 0, ‘neither agree nor disagree’ (In 418 
condition, M = .061, SE = .180; Out condition, M = .324, SE = .106) [range: -3 to +3]. Indeed, 419 
Independent t-tests revealed Total RHIQ was significantly greater than zero in the Out (t(27) = 3.051, 420 
p = .005) but not In conditions (t(21) = .339, p = .738). 421 
Analysis of individual scale scores revealed this low value was caused by some scales receiving 422 
positive endorsement (i.e. ‘agreement’) and some negative endorsement (i.e. ‘disagreement’). 423 
Almost all the individual scales, however, received statistically significant endorsement. Qualitative 424 
endorsement (positive or negative) of scales was identical across conditions indicating high similarity 425 
in the nature of subjective RHI experience between conditions [see Figure
2
]. Participants in both 426 
conditions reported experiencing changes in embodiment [Embodiment], ownership [Ownership, 427 
Botvinick & Cohen (1998) Ownership] and perceived location [Location]. All participants reported 428 
the experience being positive [Affect] and no altered sensation in their hand [Sensation]. 429 
A mixed 2x11 ANOVA compared RHI direction (In vs. Out) and RHI questionnaire condition (11 430 
scales). It revealed a significant main effect of questionnaire condition, F(10, 480) = 65.12, p < .001, 431 
demonstrating the varying levels of endorsement across the scales. The main effect of RHI direction 432 
was not significant, F(1,48) = 1.82, p = .183, suggesting levels of subjective illusion intensity were 433 
equivalent in the In and Out conditions. Therefore, contrary to predictions, we did not see a 434 
reduction in the overall level of RHI intensity when position was shifted away from the body-position 435 
(Out), compared to when it was shifted towards the real body location (In). The interaction of 436 
questionnaire condition and direction was also non-significant, F(10,480) = .614, p = .802. 437 
 438 
# Figure2 approximately here # 439 
3.4. Relationship between subjective and proprioceptive RHI outcomes  440 
The relationship between subjective and proprioceptive RHI outcomes within each condition 441 
was assessed separately using Pearson’s correlation coefficients (using Bonferroni corrections for 442 
multiple comparisons – 11 comparisons, 1 per scale). 443 
Despite the non-significant difference between subjective RHI outcomes for In and Out 444 
conditions, the relationship between proprioceptive drift and subjective illusion did differ between 445 
conditions. There was a significant positive correlation between the RHIQ total score and drift 446 
magnitude in the In Condition (r = .473, p = .026), whereby as level of drift increased so did 447 
endorsement of the questionnaire. Importantly, no such relationship was seen in the Out Condition 448 
(r = .144, p = .464).  449 
A Fisher r-to-z transformation was completed to compare the significance of the correlation 450 
between drift and RHIQ total between the In and Out conditions. A significant difference was found 451 
between the correlations in these two conditions, z = 1.21, p > .05 (using a two-tailed comparison). 452 
This demonstrates, the correlation in the In condition (which was significant), was significantly larger 453 
than the correlation in the Out condition (which was null). 454 
This result is particularly interesting because it demonstrates that, despite the overall similarity 455 
in reported illusion intensity between conditions, there was a relationship between the amount of 456 
drift and the intensity of the illusion only when RHI was conducted towards the body. 457 
Looking at the subscales, the Location scale correlated significantly with drift in the In (r = .811, 458 
p = .027) but not Out (r = .508, p = .134) condition suggesting subjective location change was 459 
associated with actual proprioceptive change. The Botvinick and Cohen (1998) scale also correlated 460 
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with drift in the In (r = .412, p = .05) but not Out (r = .158, p = .432) condition which is consistent 461 
with previous studies employing the same measure (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Lenggenhager et al., 462 
2007; Longo et al., 2008a). Various other subscales were approaching significance in the In condition 463 
but no subscales were related to drift in the Out condition [see TableB]. 464 
 465 
Previous studies have demonstrated that there is variation in the experience of the RHI across 466 
participants, with some experiencing it to a greater or lesser extent (Asai, Mao, Sugimori, & Tanno, 467 
2011; Mussap & Salton, 2006; Peled, Ritsner, Hirschmann, Geva, & Modai, 2000). It was thought that 468 
the participants who were not affected by the illusion might be reducing variability in the total 469 
proprioceptive change score by the inclusion of their mean scores which would be consistently zero 470 
or close to zero centimetres change. This could potentially obscure the relationship between 471 
subjective and proprioceptive RHI outcomes. To address this, participants experiencing high levels of 472 
illusory position change were identified and analysed as a separate group. 473 
Participants with mean drift magnitude falling in the top quartile (25%) of scores were selected 474 
(In [N = 7], M = 3.00, SE = 0.41; Out [N = 10], M = 3.96, SE = 0.83). Within this group, the correlation 475 
between drift magnitude and Total RHIQ subjective intensity was more strongly significant 476 
(compared with the whole sample) in the In condition (r = .831, p = .021) but remained non-477 
significant in the Out Condition (r = .280, p = .260). 478 
Once again, a Fisher r-to-z transformations with two-tailed comparisons demonstrated the 479 
significance of the correlation between drift and RHIQ total was significantly different in the In and 480 
Out conditions, z = 2.97, p < .05 (with the In correlation being larger than the Out). 481 
Also within the high-drift group, Pearson correlation statistics (corrected for multiple 482 
comparisons) showed a number of additional RHIQ subscales (Embodiment, Ownership and 483 
Sensation) became correlated with drift in the In condition though all correlations remained non-484 
significant in the Out condition [see TableB]. 485 
Overall, in the In condition a relationship was seen between proprioceptive drift and, not only 486 
the RHIQ Total scale, but also a number of subscales. In the Out condition, however, there was no 487 
relationship between the amount of subjective RHI – total or scales – and drift magnitude. 488 
 489 
# Table B approximately here# 490 
 491 
3.5. Similarity in appearance ratings 492 
General rating statistics 493 
Appearance scores ranged from  1 to 8 in the In Condition and 1 to 10  in Out [full range, 1 to 494 
10] with low overall means (i.e. close to 5, ‘neither similar nor dissimilar’) in both conditions (In, M = 495 
5.54, SE = 0.41; Out, M = 5.18, SE = 0.45). Independent-Groups t-tests revealed there were no 496 
significant differences in appearance ratings between In and Out conditions, t(48) = -.58, p = .565. 497 
Relationship between appearance ratings, subjective illusion and proprioceptive drift 498 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients demonstrated there was no evidence of an association 499 
between appearance ratings and drift magnitude (In, r = .035, p = .877; Out, r = .052, p = .791) or 500 
RHIQ total (In, r = .306, p = .166; Out, r =.249, p = .202) in either the In or Out conditions. This was in 501 
line with predictions in so far as proprioceptive change had no effect on visual perception of the 502 
rubber hand. Contrary to predictions, however, the relationship between similarity in appearance 503 
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ratings and subjective illusion intensity seen in Longo et al. (2008a) was not demonstrated in this 504 
experimental context. 505 
Subjective vs. objective perceptions of appearance similarity 506 
Appearance ratings were analysed for their relationship with experimenter ratings of skin-tone 507 
and gender. This was done to assess whether participant’s ratings of appearance matched these 508 
more objective markers of appearance. One-Way ANOVA tests (one per RHI direction condition) 509 
revealed there were no significant differences in appearance ratings between individuals with light 510 
(e.g. Caucasian), medium (e.g. Asian) or darker (e.g. African) skin-tone in either condition (In, F(2) = 511 
1.50, p = .249; Out, F(2) = 0.03, p = .969), meaning actual differences in hand appearance (in terms of 512 
colour) had no effect on similarity ratings. Females reported higher ratings of similarity in 513 
appearance than males in the Out condition (Females, M = 6.16, SE = .47; Males, M = 4.22, SE = .64; 514 
t(26) = -2.39, p = .024) but not the In condition (Females, M = 5.64, SE = .66; Males, M = 4.73, SE = 515 
.60; t(20) = -1.01, p = .324)c. Therefore, only in the Out condition did gender – an objective marker of 516 
appearance similarity (in terms of size, skin-texture and hair-coverage) correlate with appearance 517 
scores. Overall, it appeared that objective similarity in appearance was not related to ratings of 518 
appearance similarity. 519 
 520 
Footnotec: The hand image used was a set of Caucasian, female hands. Nails were cut short to 521 
reduce the impact of this gender-defining appearance feature, making the hands somewhat more 522 
gender-neutral. 523 
 524 
3.6. Similarity in felt brushing ratings 525 
General rating statistics 526 
Unlike appearance ratings, brushing ratings were quite high, ranging from 4 to 10 with a mean 527 
of 8.55 (SE = 0.33) in the In condition, and from 7 to 10, mean 9.07 (SE = 0.16) in the Out condition. 528 
Brushing ratings were significantly higher than appearance ratings in both In (t(21) = -6.41, p < .001) 529 
and Out (t(27) = -8.13, p < .001). There were no significant differences in overall ratings of brushing 530 
similarity between conditions, t(48) = -1.418, p = .166. The data suggest that overall participants in 531 
both conditions felt the tactile stimulation they felt on their own hand matched that seen on the 532 
rubber hand. 533 
 534 
Relationship between brushing ratings, subjective illusion and proprioceptive drift 535 
We then investigated whether RHI outcomes were related to the participant’s perceived 536 
effectiveness of the visuo-tactile manipulation. As with appearance ratings, Pearson Correlation 537 
Coefficients demonstrated a non-significant relationship between drift magnitude and brushing in 538 
the In (r = .142, p = .529) and Out conditions (r = .236, p = .228). Felt shifts in location (proprioceptive 539 
alterations) did not alter tactile perception. In the In condition, brushing correlated significantly with 540 
RHIQ total (r = .428, p = .047): as subjective illusion intensity increased, so did the perceived 541 
similarity between brushing seen on the rubber hand and that felt on the participant’s own hand. 542 
There was no such relationship between RHIQ total and brushing (r = .170, p = .386) in the Out 543 
condition supporting an alteration in the nature of subjective RHI experience when top-down body 544 
information was violated. 545 
 546 
Subjective vs. objective perceptions of brushing similarity 547 
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Experimenter ratings of RHI brushing precision were analysed. Trial scores were averaged to 548 
produce an overall score for each participant. Brushing precision was deemed to be high (In, M = 549 
96.82%, SE = 2.41; Out, M = 94.64%, SE = 1.96) and did not differ significantly across In-Out 550 
condition, t(48) = .709, p = .482. Though this measure relies on human judgement and therefore 551 
potentially susceptible to situational fluctuations, the experimenter was blind to levels of subjective 552 
and proprioceptive RHI levels which reduced the likelihood of experimenter bias confounds. 553 
 554 
4. Discussion 555 
4.1. Subjective and proprioceptive aspects of body representation are differentially affected by top-556 
down factors 557 
4.1.1. Evidence from our experiment 558 
 In the current study, we used the rubber hand illusion to create a mismatch between higher-559 
order information about body position and body information generated by the senses. This was 560 
done by drawing felt position away from the veridical body position towards extracorporeal space 561 
(RHI Out condition). Subjective and proprioceptive components of self-representation were 562 
compared between this condition and a condition of traditional RHI where limb position was drawn 563 
towards the actual body position (RHI In condition). 564 
We found two important patterns in the data. First, subjective and proprioceptive components 565 
of self-representation are distinct. Second, they are also differentially affected by top-down factors. 566 
While we were able to produce proprioceptive drift in both conditions consistently, incongruent 567 
information about body position in the Out condition modulated subjective RHI outcomes. This was 568 
most clearly demonstrated when the significant correlation between subjective and proprioceptive 569 
outcomes, found in the RHI In condition, was abolished in the Out condition. 570 
When looking at the high proprioceptive illusion group alone, this relationship became even 571 
more evident with a much stronger correlation between subjective and proprioceptive RHI 572 
outcomes in the In condition. Analysis of the questionnaire subscales provided more detailed 573 
information about the exact nature of subjective RHI experience. We saw items assessing subjective 574 
perceptions of hand location change (Location scale) were highly related to actual location change 575 
(drift). The Botvinick and Cohen (1998) Ownership scale also correlated highly with proprioceptive 576 
outcomes in the In condition suggesting felt ownership of the hand was associated with drift 577 
magnitude. This finding is consistent with various previous studies that incorporated this scale in 578 
their measure of subjective RHI (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Longo et al., 579 
2008a) supporting the validity of our RHI Total scale. Overall it appears that for movements towards 580 
the body, proprioceptive recalibration is associated with the level of change in subjective bodily 581 
experience. More specifically, as embodiment and ownership increase for the rubber hand so does 582 
the level of drift. In opposition to this, when perceived location is shifted away from the body, there 583 
is no associated change in subjective self-representation – rather the levels vary independently.584 
 585 
Consistent with this, in the In condition, a significant positive correlation was found between 586 
subjective RHI and self-rated similarity in tactile perceptions – in that participants reporting high 587 
levels of subjective embodiment of the hand image perceived a greater match between tactile 588 
sensations administered to the hand image and those felt on their own hand. This relationship, 589 
however, also became non-significant in the Out condition. We propose this too demonstrates the 590 
alteration of subjective embodiment of the hand image by top-down factors. 591 
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 592 
This finding adds to the new but growing body of evidence (Holle et al., 2011; Kammers et al., 593 
2008; Rohde et al., 2011) that human self-representation consists of a number of distinct processes 594 
subserved by separate neural systems. Neurophysiological studies demonstrate the role of the 595 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL) in localising the body and body parts (Ogawa & Inui, 2007a; Ogden, 596 
1985) and in the recalibration of limb position in the RHI (Kammers et. al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2007) 597 
suggesting this may be the location of body-perception systems. 598 
Subjective body-representation on the other hand is thought to be subserved by a system 599 
encompassing ventral premotor (PMv) and cerebellar areas (Ehrsson et al., 2005; Ehrsson et al., 600 
2004). These areas detect concurrent multisensory inputs arising from the body and integrate them 601 
to produce self-identification over the object of stimulation, subsequently producing the special 602 
perceptual experience of that object belonging to the self (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 603 
2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris et al., 2008) – as quantified by subjective RHI measures. 604 
While they are indeed independent constructs, many studies (including ours) have found 605 
subjective and proprioceptive RHI measures to covary. We believe this correlation most likely 606 
reflects the function of a remote common mechanism that determines susceptibility to both forms 607 
of RHI outcome, rather than a direct causative relationship as was once thought. Rohde et al. (2011) 608 
propose a strong reliance on vision in body judgements might lead to both increased visuo-609 
proprioceptive recalibration (drift) and intermodal matching of visual and tactile inputs causing felt 610 
ownership. Thus, levels of subjective and proprioceptive outcomes would covary without directly 611 
causally affecting each other. In the light of this dissociation, relationships between other 612 
components of self-representation that are assumed to be causative (e.g. physiological RHI 613 
outcomes that are hypothesised to be caused by changes in subjective ownership) may require 614 
further exploration. 615 
 616 
Representation of self – the role of the posterior parietal cortex 617 
The representation of self is a complicated and multifaceted process. The RHI is a neat paradigm 618 
that can easily and quickly manipulate two particular aspects of self-representation – subjective 619 
ownership and embodiment as well as proprioceptive position. As mentioned previously, these 620 
alterations have been demonstrated to critically be subserved by the PMv and IPL respectively. In 621 
the same way as these two RHI outcomes cannot be said to represent the entire spectrum of the 622 
human experience of ‘selfhood’ we do not suggest here that these two brain areas support the 623 
entirety of self-representation.  624 
One area that must be mentioned in a discussion of self-representation is the posterior parietal 625 
cortex which is critically involved in multisensory coding of body part position [in non-human 626 
primates] (Graziano, Cooke, & Taylor, 2000), recursive recalculation and updating of the current 627 
body state from sensory and motor signals (Wolpert, Goodbody, & Husain, 1998), the storage of 628 
multiple internal reference frames for the encoding and use of sensory information (Bernier & 629 
Grafton, 2010), monitoring internal versus externally generated actions (Ogawa & Inui, 2007b) and – 630 
in non-human primates – the alteration of the body schema to incorporate external objects, such as 631 
tools (Iriki, Tanaka, & Iwamura, 1996). 632 
 633 
4.1.2. Implications for existing theories of the effects of top-down factors on self-representation 634 
 Tsakiris and colleagues (2010) developed a two-step model of self-representation to explain 635 
the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes in the identification of an object as self. First, 636 
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visual inputs are matched with stored information about the body. If there is a sufficient fit with this 637 
internal body image then inputs are assessed for intermodal matching, with a match leading to 638 
integration of this object into the self-image. 639 
Our data suggest that this model is valid but may apply only to subjective self-representation. 640 
We propose that subjective bodily experience is dependent on processes of intermodal matching 641 
and requires consistency between internal and sensory information about the body (as described 642 
above). In contrast, our results suggest proprioceptive self-representation is not affected by higher-643 
order cognitive factors. Consistent with this idea, Holle et al. (2011) were able to produce drift to a 644 
hand placed in an anatomically impossible position (thereby violating top-down body information) 645 
without felt ownership over this hand. They provided evidence that two previous studies reporting 646 
an ‘attenuation’ of drift to rotated limbs (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) 647 
were simply lacking in power to detect this small effect size due to insufficient sample sizes. Indeed, 648 
also contrary to traditional theories, it is becoming increasingly clear that intermodal matching is not 649 
necessary for the production of proprioceptive drift. This is supported by various studies that 650 
demonstrate drift under conditions of asynchronous stimulation (Rohde et al, 2011) or even in the 651 
absence of tactile stimulation all-together (Durgin, Evans, Dunphy, Klostermann, & Simmons, 2007; 652 
Rohde et al., 2011). 653 
The robust nature of proprioceptive RHI outcomes is likely due to the simple, bottom-up 654 
mechanism that governs bodily perception. Rohde et al. (2011) suggest alterations in perceptual 655 
body position (proprioceptive drift) in the RHI occurs as a result of visuo-proprioceptive recalibration 656 
where felt position is drawn to match the false visual information about position provided by the 657 
rubber hand. 658 
 659 
‘RHI susceptibility’ should be considered separately for subjective and proprioceptive outcomes 660 
‘RHI susceptibility’ refers to the ability to experience the illusory effect of the RHI. Analysing the 661 
prevalence of RHI effects in different groups and under different experimental conditions can reveal 662 
important information about the necessary and sufficient conditions required to manipulate human 663 
bodily experience. We suggest that consideration of RHI outcomes as a unitary phenomenon in the 664 
past may have lead to misrepresentation of this susceptibility in the literature. Often, due to the 665 
assumed causative relationship, estimates are based on one measure (subjective or proprioceptive) 666 
alone and these terms are used interchangeably or combined into a blanket representation of both 667 
outcomes (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Kammers et al., 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 668 
If proprioceptive alterations in the RHI are simply a product of an intersensory bias that is 669 
common to all perceptual systems than drift towards the rubber hand should occur whenever false 670 
visual information about the hand position is presented. Consistent with this idea, our study found 671 
the majority (75%) of individuals showed levels of drift significantly greater than zero. If drift is as 672 
ubiquitous as we believe, ‘non-significant drift’ (in our study and others) may simply be caused by 673 
experimental power that is too low to detect a small (but extant) effect. 674 
A number of pathological groups have been identified as having altered susceptibility to the RHI 675 
in terms of intensity and time to onset of illusion. In some groups predisposition to the illusion is 676 
increased, as in individuals with schizophrenia (Peled et al., 2000), schizotypal personalities (Asai et 677 
al., 2011), eating disorders, particularly bulimia (Fiehler, Burke, Engel, Bien, & Rösler, 2008; Mussap 678 
& Salton, 2006), and dissociation disorder (Kanayama, Sato, & Ohira, 2007); and in some groups, 679 
reduced, such as those on the Autistic spectrum (Cascio, Foss-Feig, Burnette, Heacock, & Cosby, 680 
2012). Various theories have been put forward for altered RHI experience within these groups 681 
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including increased malleability of body-representation (in eating disordered individuals, Mussap & 682 
Salton, 2006), altered functional connectivity (in schizophrenics, Peled et al., 2000) and either an 683 
over-reliance on proprioceptive inputs or under-reliance on visual information (in those with autism 684 
spectrum disorder, Cascio et al., 2012). 685 
Investigating susceptibility to subjective and proprioceptive RHI outcomes separately could 686 
provide much more specific information about the nature of body representation deficits in clinical 687 
groups than considering them together.  For example, selective alterations in proprioceptive drift 688 
with the sparing of subjective embodiment and ownership may indicate an aberration in the 689 
weighting of sensory information in bodily judgements in the IPL. Specific modulation of subjective 690 
representation however could indicate a fault in intermodal matching systems in the PMv, or an 691 
alteration in the effect of higher-order cognitive factors on multisensory systems. A bimodal RHI 692 
susceptibility measure would have great utility within the field of psychopathy.  693 
 694 
4.2. Production of drift away from the body location demonstrates proprioceptive change in the RHI 695 
is more than an attentional bias to central space 696 
To our knowledge, this study is the first of its kind to successfully produce alterations in 697 
perceived limb position (i.e. proprioceptive drift) away from the body into extracorporeal space 698 
using the RHI. Given that drift had previously been created exclusively towards the body, it was 699 
impossible to know whether some, if not all, of the change previously attributed to the RHI 700 
manipulation was actually a product of a bias towards central space or natural position recalibration 701 
(not caused by the illusion). 702 
Humans are known to have a strong attentional bias to the visual space where most manual 703 
behaviours occur, central peripersonal space (Downing & Peelen, 2011; Lloyd, Azañón, & Poliakoff, 704 
2010; Losier & Klein, 2004). It has been suggested that in the absence of visual information felt limb 705 
position shifts in towards the body midline when the hand is kept still (Beers, Sittig, & Denier van der 706 
Gon, 1998; Ghilardi, Gordon, & Ghez, 1995; van Beers et al., 1999) and during action execution 707 
(Holmes et al., 2006) [though, see Desmurget, Vindras, Grea, Viviani (2000) who found no 708 
proprioceptive drift over time]. 709 
From these results, it could be inferred that proprioceptive change towards the body 710 
documented in RHI experiments could simply have resulted from a reduction in the ability to localise 711 
limb position (due either to lack of visual position information and/or the degradation in kinaesthetic 712 
cues due to the limb being held still over the RHI induction). The production of drift in and out from 713 
the body in our study demonstrates it is possible to draw felt position away from the body and 714 
supports the productive role of RHI induction in such perceptual alterations. 715 
Interestingly, a number of disorders affecting body representation involve a shift of self-location 716 
away from the actual body position. These include Out of Body Experiences (and other Autoscopic 717 
Hallucinations) where the individual feels their self is located outside their body (Blanke & Arzy, 718 
2005; Blanke et al., 2004) and somatoparaphrenia, where a body-part or whole side of the body is 719 
attributed away from the participant onto another individual (Feinberg, Venneri, Simone, Fan, & 720 
Northoff, 2010; Losada-Del Pozo et al., 2011; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). Similarities between these 721 
disorders and the strange perceptual alterations in RHI suggest a common mechanism of 722 
multisensory integration may underlie these various disruptions of self-representation. 723 
 724 
4.3. Subjective-embodiment can alter perceptions of touch in line with expectations 725 
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Self-representation is especially important to the experience of touch because the body forms 726 
part of the tactile experience (de Vignemont, Ehrsson, & Haggard, 2005). In the current study we 727 
found evidence that incorporation of a false hand into the self-representation can alter perception 728 
of tactile inputs on the participant’s own hand, whereby felt touch on the own hand is assimilated to 729 
match seen touch on the false hand. We found that participants with high levels of subjective 730 
illusion had significantly higher ratings of matching between tactile inputs seen on the ‘rubber’ hand 731 
image and those felt on their own hand, compared to those experiencing low subjective illusion – 732 
even though no such differences actually existed (as determined by analysis of variations in actual 733 
tactile inputs using experimenter ratings of brushing effectiveness [see Methods, section 2.7]). This 734 
indicates that perception of tactile inputs was independent of actual variation in brushing 735 
administration. We propose that if actual tactile similarity did not affect the perceived similarity, 736 
then this is most likely caused by the incorporation of the seen hand into the body representation. 737 
The modulation of tactile perception by visual information is supported by other experiments 738 
that demonstrate perceptions in one modality can be skewed to match information from another 739 
modality. For example, double-flash experiments where an illusory flash in a visual stimulus is 740 
caused by bursts of auditory noise (Shams, Kamitani, & Shimojo, 2002). In the opposite direction, the 741 
modulatory effect of vision on auditory perception has been well established in ventriloquist effect 742 
studies (Haans, Kaiser, Bouwhuis, & Ijsselsteijn, 2012; Shams et al., 2002) and McGurk experiments 743 
(McGurk & Macdonald, 1976). 744 
Unlike subjective outcomes, the association of proprioceptive outcomes and brushing ratings 745 
was non-significant. This is further support for the dissociation of these two components of self-746 
representation. It also demonstrates shifting felt position to match illusory visual position does not 747 
affect bodily perceptions in the same way as altering subjective ownership over that limb. 748 
Previous research has demonstrated vision of the body can alter the perception of tactile 749 
inputs. For example, vision of a participants hand enhances tactile discrimination on that hand 750 
(Visual Enhancement of Touch, or VET) (Kennett, Taylor-Clarke, & Haggard, 2001; Taylor-Clarke, 751 
Kennett, & Haggard, 2002) even when this vision is non-informative. More recently Longo, Betti, 752 
Aglioti and Haggard (2009) demonstrated that it is perception of the own body not just any body 753 
that modulates tactile acuity. 754 
While these studies demonstrate improvement of tactile perception by vision of the own body  755 
(Kennett et al., 2001; Taylor-Clarke et al., 2002), our results indicate reduced detection of tactile 756 
inputs on the body. This may be because in our study participants were provided with a visual input 757 
that aims to override tactile experience where VET studies simply provide a still image of the body – 758 
thus no alternate stimulus to skew perception. Regardless of whether vision of the body increases or 759 
decreases acuity of tactile perception, the results of these various studies demonstrate the critical 760 
role of visual information in tactile perception. 761 
Akin to our results similar reductions in the influence of tactile inputs on perception by vision of 762 
the body have been seen in pain research. Looking at your own body while being exposed to a 763 
painful stimulus reduces both self-reported intensity and neural indicators of pain (Longo, Betti, et 764 
al., 2009). Interestingly, this analgesic effect is intensified when participants view an enlarged image 765 
of their hand and is reduced by a hand image smaller than veridical size (Mancini, Longo, Kammers, 766 
& Haggard, 2011). 767 
 768 
Contrary to predictions, our study did not produce a significant relationship between subjective 769 
RHI and perceived similarity in appearance as was found by the Longo group (2009). We believe this 770 
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may be because our experimental methodology altered the nature of subjective RHI experience in a 771 
way that affected this relationship. Specifically, endorsement of the Embodiment subscale was 772 
somewhat reduced in our study compared with levels in the Longo et al. (2009) study. They found 773 
this particular scale to be critically important in producing the relationship between similarity in 774 
appearance ratings and subjective illusion. 775 
Along a different vein, this non-significant result may have been related to the phrasing of the 776 
similarity in appearance question itself. As mentioned previously, the goodness-of-fit model that 777 
compares sensory information about the body to the body image (Tsakiris, 2010) appears not to be 778 
fully specified, with some aspects of appearance affecting RHI outcomes (such as size of the hand; 779 
Pavani & Zampini, 2007) but not others (like skin colour; Farmer, Tajadura-Jimenez, & Tsakiris, 2012). 780 
Splitting the similarity in appearance question into a number of questions that independently assess 781 
these categories of appearance may reveal differences not found with our more generalised 782 
question. 783 
 784 
4.4. Limitations of the current study 785 
While this study provides interesting insights into the nature of top-down effects on different 786 
aspects of body-representation, one limitation that should be addressed is that other measures of 787 
proprioceptive change than the kind used here may produce different results. We employed an 788 
estimation of body position that required participants to report aloud which number on a ruler best 789 
corresponded with the position of their hidden middle finger while their hands were kept still. Other 790 
studies have utilised active estimations of body location such as intermanual reaches (Botvinick & 791 
Cohen, 1998) or reach-to-target actions (Heed et al., 2011). Evidence has recently been brought 792 
forward that suggests these different proprioceptive RHI measures are supported by different neural 793 
systems and therefore may be affected differently by RHI induction. For example, Kammers and 794 
colleagues (2009) found that immediate proprioceptive judgements of hand location are modified by 795 
rTMS over the IPL but subjective ownership over the rubber hand and ballistic motor movements are 796 
not (Kammers et al., 2009). Future experiments may include a variety of position estimations, such 797 
as action based pointing measures, to allow a more complete picture of the effect of higher-order 798 
cognitive factors on multisensory perceptual illusions. 799 
 800 
4.5. Summary and conclusions 801 
Human self-representation is a complex process critically dependent on systems of multisensory 802 
integration. It is becoming clear that self-representation consists of several distinct components, 803 
with neural circuits in the PMv supporting subjective, first-person bodily experience and the IPL 804 
underpinning proprioceptive body judgements and location of the self in space. 805 
Our study suggests that these separate components are affected differentially by higher-order 806 
cognitive factors. Subjective bodily experience is sensitive to mismatch between internally stored 807 
information about the body state and information generated by the senses while body perception, 808 
as a simple sensory phenomenon, is relatively robust to such violations. We used the RHI to draw 809 
limb location away from the veridical body location into space, thereby supporting the role of the 810 
illusion in creating position change over the effects of attentional biases or natural proprioceptive 811 
recalibration towards central space. Finally, we found that incorporation of a hand image into self-812 
representation can alter perception of tactile inputs, assimilating felt touch in line with visual touch 813 
information. 814 
20 
 
In conclusion, while original theories regarding the neural mechanisms underpinning the RHI 815 
require revision, this paradigm useful tool for navigating the complexities of human bodily 816 
experience.817 
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Footnotes 
 
# Footnote A # 
 
Footnotea. Sample questions for each of the five separate components of subjective self-
representation as described by Longo et al. (2008a) 
Embodiment: “It seemed like the hand image was part of my body” (Q3) 
Loss of Own Hand: “It seemed like my hand disappeared” (Q16) 
Movement: “It seemed like my hand was moving towards the hand image” (Q18) 
Affect: “I found the experience enjoyable” (Q20) 
Sensation: “I had the sensation of pins and needles in my hand” (Q22) 
 
# Footnote B # 
Footnoteb: An alpha level of .05 was used as the significance criterion for all statistical tests. 
Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons were applied where necessary. 
 
# Footnote C # 
 
Footnotec: The hand image used was a set of Caucasian, female hands. Nails were cut short to 
reduce the impact of this gender-defining appearance feature, making the hands somewhat more 
gender-neutral. 
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Table A. Proprioceptive judgements for the In and Out conditions. Pre-RHI error refers to the 
estimation of hand position before the RHI induction, Post-RHI the estimate taken directly after RHI 
induction. Pre was subtracted from Post-RHI error to create a difference score, called Drift 
Magnitude, representing proprioceptive change resulting from the illusion. 
 
 In Condition Out Condition 
Pre-RHI error M = 2.62 
SE = 0.37 
M = 3.83 
SE = 0.47 
Post-RHI error M = 3.94 
SE = 0.38 
M = 6.43 
SE = 0.38 
Drift Magnitude M = 1.31 
SE = 0.30 
M = 2.60 
SE = 0.24 
 
Tables
Table B. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for the relationship between subjective (RHI Questionnaire Total and scales) and proprioceptive (Drift Magnitude) 
RHI outcomes. These are listed for the sample as a whole (left columns) and for the ‘high drift group’ *top quartile of Drift Magnitude scores] (right columns) 
alone. 
    Whole sample   High drift group       Whole sample   High drift group 
    Correlation with   Correlation with       Correlation with   Correlation with 
    Drift Magnitude   Drift Magnitude       Drift Magnitude   Drift Magnitude 
Condition   In Out   In Out   Condition   In Out   In Out 
RHI Total r 0.473 0.144   0.831 0.391                 
  p 0.026 0.464   0.021 0.264                 
               Embodiment r 0.387 0.205 
 
0.771 0.373 
 
Movement r 0.225 0.203 
 
0.378 0.18 
 
p 0.075 0.296 
 
0.042 0.289 
  
p 0.314 0.3 
 
0.403 0.619 
               Ownership r 0.4 0.198 
 
0.859 0.372 
 
Affect r 0.325 -0.014 
 
0.558 0.053 
(Embodiment Subscale) p 0.065 0.312 
 
0.013 0.29 
  
p 0.141 0.943 
 
0.193 0.885 
               Location r 0.457 0.19 
 
0.811 0.508 
 
Sensation r 0.109 -0.066 
 
0.766 0.392 
(Embodiment Subscale) p 0.032 0.333 
 
0.027 0.134 
  
p 0.63 0.738 
 
0.045 0.263 
               Agency r 0.054 -0.03 
 
0.47 -0.203 
 
Supernumerary Limb r 0.237 -0.359 
 
-0.056 -0.179 
(Embodiment Subscale) p 0.81 0.881 
 
0.287 0.574 
  
p 0.289 0.061 
 
0.904 0.621 
               Loss of Hand r 0.41 0.177 
 
0.062 0.113 
 
Botvinick & Cohen r 0.412 0.158 
 
0.693 0.427 
 
p 0.058 0.367 
 
0.895 0.757 
 
Ownership p 0.050 0.423 
 
0.084 0.218 
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Figure Captions 
Figure
1a
. Schematic of experimental apparatus for RHI induction. A. Computer monitor, B. Mirror for 
reflection of hand image stimuli (presented on screen (A) above, C. Cloth draped over subject’s 
shoulders to prevent visual information about arm/ body position, D. Computer tower 
 
Figure
1b
. Representation of the locations of the real hand and hand image *‘1’ & ‘2’+. In the RHI In 
condition the subject’s hand was positioned at location ‘1’ and the hand image appeared on the 
computer screen at ‘2’(8cm apart) so the direction of illusory location change was in, towards the 
body. Positions were swapped in the Out condition so the subject’s hand was at ‘2’ and the hand 
image appeared at ‘1 [as seen in Figure 1b above]’. ‘3’ represents the location at which the ruler for 
proprioceptive estimation appeared on the computer screen – one of a set of 15 rulers was randomly 
selected to appear in this position. 
 
Figure
2
. Mean endorsement of RHI Questionnaire Total and Scale Scores for the In [light grey bars] 
and Out [dark grey bars] conditions. Bars projecting to the right represent positive endorsement of 
that scale. Projections to the left represent negative endorsement. Asterisks represent comparison of 
mean scale score with zero (using t-tests with Bonferroni corrections for multiple-comparisons), * 
indicates significance at or below .05 alpha and ** indicates significance at or below .001. 
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